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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, 2008
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission"
or "FCC") had the authority to adopt an Order interpreting a provision of the
Communications Act of 1934 and whether the contents of the Order merited
judicial deference pursuant to Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or if the Commission's rulemaking activity in
promulgating the Order was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied
petitioners' review of the Order, finding that the Commission was authorized
to draft rules implementing a section of the Communications Act that con-
tained no reference to the FCC but did provide for a judicial review remedy.
Furthermore, the court gave judicial deference to FCC's construction since the
term "unreasonably" in the statute was found to be ambiguous. Next, the court
held that the four rules articulated in section 621, were reasonable and permis-
sible statutory construction. Finally, the court found that the FCC did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in drafting this rule.
History: Local Franchising Authorities ("LFAs") and the Commission have
both sought to exert their influence in regulating cable. In 1984, Congress
passed the Cable Communications Policy of 1984 as an amendment to the
Communications Act. By inserting Title VI provisions into the Communica-
tions Act, the legislation was intended to establish a national policy clarifying
the regulation of cable television. The Commission was granted exclusive ju-
risdiction over cable services while the LFAs had the authority to award cable
franchises. In 1992, Congress again intervened by enacting the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act, revising section 621(a)(1) of
Title VI to specify that an LFA may grant "one or more franchises within its
jurisdiction; except that a franchising authority may not grant an exclusive
franchise and may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive
franchise." Congress provided for a judicial remedy by allowing applicants to
bring an action before federal or state court within 120 days after receiving a
final, adverse decision from an LFA.
Subsequently, the FCC initiated a rulemaking, inviting comment on two is-
sues: whether the franchising process' goals of "enhanced cable competition
and accelerated broadband deployment" were being unreasonably obstructed,
and what constitutes an "unreasonable refusal to award an additional competi-
tive franchise under section 621(a)(1)." After receiving and reviewing com-
ments filed by new entrants, incumbent cable operators, LFAs, and consumer
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groups, the FCC adopted the Order which not only established the FCC's rule
making authority to implement provisions of the Communications Act, but also
established five rules meant to clarify the meaning of the word "unreasonable"
within section 621(a)(1). The rules regarded time restrictions on competitive
application decisions, build-out mandates, franchise fees, public, educational
and governmental ("PEG") channel access, and an LFA's inability to refuse a
franchise based on issues unrelated to cable services.
Discussion: Petitioners contended that Congress never delegated power to
the FCC to interpret section 621(a)(1). The court examined section 201(b), an
amendment to the Communications Act, which provided that the Commission
could prescribe rules as necessary and in the public interest to carry out the
Act. The FCC has jurisdictional authority to formulate rules interpreting sec-
tion 621(a)(1). Petitioners further asserted that Congress intended the courts to
serve as the only other body with jurisdiction over section 621 (a)(1). The court
reasoned that the courts retain their jurisdiction to hear appeals involving deni-
als of franchise applications, but that the LFAs are better suited to deal with
what is reasonable in terms of franchise distribution.
After determining that the Commission had underlying authority to issue the
Order, the court turned its attention to whether the contents of the Order mer-
ited judicial deference to administrative interpretations pursuant to Chevron
USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 461 U.S. 956 (1983). Chevron
articulated a two-step inquiry to determine if judicial deference is warranted.
First, the court must ask whether the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue
at hand. If so, the court must determine whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute. The court reasoned that the lan-
guage of section 621(a)(1) is ambiguous since it is capable of many meanings.
In order to give meaning to the phrase "unreasonable denial," a specific factual
scenario is required.
The court next addressed the reasonableness of each of the Order's rules.
Petitioners urged the court to reject the time frame within which LFAs must
rule on the applicant's proposals as "impermissible construction of the statute"
since the statute is silent on the issue. Under Chevron, Congress is presumed to
have left to the Commission's discretion questions that it did not directly ad-
dress. Petitioners next argued that the Commission's restrictions on build-out
requirements are unreasonable. The court rejected this notion by holding that
this limitation on the authority of LFAs was reasonable. The third rule indi-
cates that incidental charges unrelated to the provision of cable services made
to new competitive entrants are subject to the statutory 5% franchise fee cap.
The court examined three district courts' independent yet similarly decided
interpretations of "incidental to" in determining that the interpretation and rule
represent reasonable constructions of the statute. In deciding the fourth rule
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regarding PEG requirements the court assessed the petitioners' argument that
the Commission distinguished between PEG facilities and PEG equipment.
The petitioner argued that the statutory language "capital costs" excludes
equipment, but the court considered the Commission's assurance that the defi-
nition of capital costs could encompass equipment if it relates to the construc-
tion of facilities.
Petitioners next contended that the Commission's rulemaking activity was
arbitrary and capricious. The court considered whether the Commission had
relied on factors Congress would not have intended or offered an explanation
for its decision that ran counter to evidence before the Commission. The
Commission reviewed over 400 comments which cumulatively articulated the
variety of methods retained by LFAs that contributed to excessive delay in
granting new franchises. Therefore, the evidence before the Commission was
enough to support its rulemaking.
Summarized by Jennifer Childs
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") acted ar-
bitrarily and capriciously in determining that CBS Co.'s ("CBS") broadcast of
a fleeting image of nudity during the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show
was actionably indecent, and whether the FCC properly found that CBS vio-
lated the indecency provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999
under three theories of liability: traditional respondeat superior doctrine, an
alternative theory of vicarious liability based on CBS's duties as a broadband
licensee, and the "willfulness" standard of the forfeiture statute.
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the FCC's policy to exempt fleeting or isolated material from the scope of ac-
tionable indecency was still in effect.
CBS was not held liable under respondeat superior doctrine for the perform-
ers' actions because the performers were independent contractors rather than
employees. The First Amendment precluded CBS from being strictly liable for
its contractors' actions based on its duties as a broadcast licensee. Additionally,
the court held that further clarification was needed from the FCC to establish if
CBS is directly liable for a forfeiture penalty under 47 U.S.C. §503(b)(1)(B)
for failing to take adequate precautionary measures to prevent potential inde-
cency during the Halftime Show. Thus, the court vacated the orders of the FCC
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
History: In response to CBS's live broadcast on February 1, 2004 of the Su-
per Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, which included Justin Timberlake tearing
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away part of Janet Jackson's costume, revealing her bare breast on camera for
less than one second, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability on Sep-
tember 22, 2004, finding that CBS had apparently violated federal law and
FCC rules which restricted the broadcast of indecent material. CBS subse-
quently submitted its Opposition to the Notice of Apparent Liability on No-
vember 5, 2004.
After concluding that the Halftime Show broadcast was indecent because it
depicted a sexual organ and violated "contemporary standards for the broad-
cast medium," the FCC issued a forfeiture order of $500,000 over CBS's Op-
position on March 15, 2006. Additionally, the FCC determined that CBS's
actions in broadcasting the Halftime Show were "willful" and thus sanction-
able for a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1).
CBS submitted a Petition for Reconsideration under 47 C.F.R § 1.106 argu-
ing against the FCC findings. In its Reconsideration Order, the FCC rejected
the statutory and constitutional challenges CBS presented in the petition and
reaffirmed its imposition of a $550,000 forfeiture. CBS filed a subsequent peti-
tion for review challenging the FCC's orders.
Discussion: Although the FCC possesses the authority to regulate indecent
broadcast content under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, it has been very restrained in exer-
cising this authority. Its longstanding policy was to exempt fleeting or isolated
material from the scope of actionable indecency, which was still in effect at the
time of the Halftime Show incident. However, the FCC alleged that its fleeting
policy applied only to expletives and not to images. The court determined that
the FCC's alleged distinction between words and images was a departure from
its prior policy, because the FCC had consistently applied identical standards
when reviewing complaints of potential indecencies for both.
Responding to an incident at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards involving the
broadcast of fleeting expletives the FCC changed its policy in March 2004.
Although it established that licensees could be held liable for broadcasting
fleeting material, the FCC stated that this new policy would not be applied ret-
roactively. The FCC cannot change its policies without supplying notice and a
reasoned explanation to the public. Thus, because CBS broadcast this Super
Bowl Halftime Show before the policy change, the FCC's prior policy exempt-
ing fleeting or isolated material from the scope of actionable indecency was
still in effect.
The court also examined whether the FCC correctly determined CBS's li-
ability for Jackson's and Timberlake's Halftime performance under three theo-
ries of liability. Under the traditional respondeat superior doctrine, the court
considered the factors established in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), to determine whether Jackson or Timberlake quali-
fied as employees of CBS or independent contractors. The court determined
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that the FCC erred in finding Jackson and Timberlake as employees by consid-
ering exclusively the "right of control" factor and not other factors, such as the
skill required of the hired party, whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects, and the method of payment. In balancing such factors, the
court held that Jackson and Timberlake were independent contractors rather
than CBS employees.
The second theory of liability presented by the FCC was that CBS may be
held liable for its independent contractors based on its duties as a broadcast
licensee. These duties include the non-delegable duties to avoid the broadcast
of indecent material and to operate in the public interest. Although such duties
are defined by statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and by corresponding agency
rule, 47 C.F.R. §73.3999(b), the First Amendment precludes CBS from being
held strictly liable for an indecent broadcast. Because these provisions sanction
and therefore could infringe upon of free speech, a First Amendment analysis
requires that the FCC prove scienter when it seeks to hold a broadcaster liable
for indecent material. Thus, because the FCC's non-delegable duty theory es-
sentially equates to strict liability for speech or expression of independent con-
tractors, the court also rejected this theory of liability.
Finally, the FCC argued that CBS was directly liable for a forfeiture penalty
under 47 U.S.C. §503(b)(1.)(B) for failing to take adequate measures to prevent
potential indecency during the Halftime Show, thus constituting a "willful"
violation of the indecency provision. CBS contended that it took precautionary
measures via its script and wardrobe reviews and additionally, implemented a
standard-industry-practice audio delay. The FCC disputed the adequacy of
these efforts by contending that CBS should have instituted a video delay
mechanism to guard against potential displays of indecency. Because the FCC
needed to demonstrate at a minimum that CBS acted recklessly when it failed
to implement a video delay mechanism, the court was unable to decide whether
CBS's actions in the Halftime broadcast were willful. The FCC has appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court.
Summarized by Rose Acoraci
In re Core Commc'ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Issue: Whether to issue a writ of mandamus that would force the Federal
Communications Commission ("Commission") to issue an Order explaining
the legal authority behind its rules on the intercarrier compensation scheme for
telecommunications traffic bound for Internet service providers ("ISPs").
Holding: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit granted a writ of mandamus forcing the Commission to respond to the
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remand issued by the court in 2002 that required the Commission to justify
their rules on intercarrier compensation.
History: Prior to the availability of broadband Internet access, "dial-up"
connections were the primary means of accessing the Internet. When using a
dial up connection, the consumer used a telephone line-likely provided by an
incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC")-placed a call to the ISP's local
phone number who in turn connected the consumer to the Internet. Usually,
however, the ISP did not have a relationship the ILEC, but instead used a com-
petitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC") to connect its calls. Thus, when a
consumer placed a call through an ILEC to an ISP, the call had to be trans-
ferred to the CLEC. The dispute in the case involved the allocation of fees
from the call.
The governing law, section 251(b)(5) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, calls for a reciprocal
compensation arrangement. Under this arrangement, ILECs would be required
to compensate CLECs for the calls they make on behalf of the ILECs to the
ISPs, but the Commission determined that section 251(b)(5) was only applica-
ble to traffic beginning and ending in a local area. In a Declaratory Ruling, the
Commission determined that ISP traffic was not local traffic, but instead inter-
state traffic and governed by 47 U.S.C. § 201. Under section 201, interstate
traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation requirement.
In Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the Commission's explanation that ISP-bound traffic
was non-local. Specifically, the court vacated and remanded the Declaratory
Ruling mandating that the Commission come up with another reason to support
its conclusion that ISP calls were non-local. In response, the Commission is-
sued its ISP Remand Order and again determined that ISP calls were not "sub-
ject to the reciprocal compensation obligations of § 251(b)(5)." This time the
Commission based its rationale on 47 U.S.C § 251(g). Under the Commis-
sion's reasoning, § 25 1(g) excluded ISP calls from the reciprocal compensation
requirement of § 251 (b)(5) because such calls constituted "information access"
and were thus regulated by the Commission under its 47 U.S.C. § 201 author-
ity. Recognizing the need to create a workable intercarrier compensation re-
gime, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at the same
time it issued the ISP Remand Order that suggested a bill-and-keep regime.
However, this regime was not instituted immediately, and instead, the Com-
mission adopted an interim method of compensation, which was supposed to
last for three years.
In 2002, the ISP Remand Order was rejected in WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC,
288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002), on the basis that section 25 1(g) did not support
the removal of ISP traffic from the reciprocation compensation requirement. In
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re Core Commc'ns, 531 F.3d at 853. Nevertheless, because the court believed
other legal authority supported the interim method of compensation prescribed
by the order it only remanded the Order and did not vacate it. As a result, the
interim compensation regime remained in place.
In 2003, Core Communications ("Core"), a CLEC, sought forbearance from
four of the interim provisions of the ISP Remand Order because of their detri-
mental effect on Core. The Commission grated in part and denied in part the
petition; the Commission's finding was later affirmed. In 2004, Core petitioned
for a writ of mandamus because the Commission had yet to respond to the re-
mand issued in WorldCom two years prior. During the adjudication of this peti-
tion, the Commission argued that they had recently taken up the intercarrier
compensation issue and sought to replace the interim rules with permanent
rules. Persuaded by this assertion, the court forewent issuing the mandamus
and instead denied Core's petition "without prejudice to refiling in the event of
significant additional delay."
In April 2006, the Commission had yet to respond to the WorldCom remand
or issue permanent compensation rules. Thus, Core filed their second forbear-
ance petition with the Commission. The FCC rejected this petition, and Core
appealed. Core subsequently filed its second mandamus petition in October
2007, asking the court to "compel the FCC to enter an order.., responding to
[the] WorldCom remand with an explanation of the legal basis for the rules that
exclude ISP-bound calls from the reciprocal compensation requirement of §
251(b)(5)." Core also requested that if the Commission did not issue an order,
the current interim rules would be vacated.
Discussion: Core sought a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act to
compel the Commission to act. Such a writ is appropriate to compel agency
action that has been unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed. The court noted
that issuing a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and only appropri-
ate "for the most transparent violations of a clear duty to act." The Commis-
sion had a clear duty to respond to its remand order issued in WorldCom, but
the court had to determine if the Commission's delay was unreasonable. Ac-
cording to the court, to be unreasonable, an agency's "delay [must be] so egre-
gious as to require a mandamus."
To make this determination, the court first outlined the six factors described
in Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.
1984) ("TRAC'). However, the court noted that because of the unique proce-
dural posture of the Core case, which effectively insulated the Commission's
decisions from further review and prevented Core from challenging the current
intercarrier compensation rules absent a mandamus action, the TRAC factors
alone would not be dispositive. Therefore, in addition to the six TRAC factors
the court also examined two precedents similar to the case at hand in which the
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court ordered an agency to act after the agency refused to respond to a previous
court ruling. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
Based on Potomac Electric Power Co. and Radio Television coupled with
the TRAC factors, the court concluded that issuing a writ of mandamus was
appropriate. Specifically, the court found that the first TRAC factor that a "rule
of reason" governs the time an agency takes to make a decision, and the fifth
TRAC factor, which looks to the interests prejudiced by delay, was decidedly
in Core's favor. These factors paired with the court's precedents requiring
agency action in similar circumstances, justified the court's decision.
The Commission argued that the court should not issue the writ because of
rulemaking proceeding on intercarrier compensation, but the court fount this
argument unpersuasive. The Commission also contended that they had recently
made an important first step in intercarrier compensation reform, and the
Chairman stated he would do everything possible to respond to the remand
issued in WorldCom within six months. However, the court found these argu-
ments unavailing as well. Finally, the court stated it could not wait for the de-
cision Core's appeal of the Commission's denial of forbearance, because this
would not address the retroactive relief available to Core nor would it address
the Commission's failure to comply with the mandate to provide a legal basis
for their rules.
In deciding the case, the court issued a writ of mandamus stating that the
Commission had six months to provide legal authority for the interim rules. If
no authority was provided, the court would presume that no such authority ex-
isted and the interim rules would be vacated. The court required the Commis-
sion to form a "final, appealable order that explains the legal authority for the
Commission's interim intercarrier compensation rules that exclude ISP-bound
traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirement of § 251(b)(5)." The
Commission responded to the writ on November 4, 2008, one day before its
deadline, but the text of the order has not been made public as of the date of
this publication.
Summarized by Sara Connor
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